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Abstract
The majority of the literature on consensus assumes that protocols are jointly started at
all nodes of the distributed system. We show how to remove this problematic assumption
in semi-synchronous systems, where messages delays and relative drifts of local clocks may
vary arbitrarily within known bounds. Our framework is self-stabilizing and efficient both
in terms of communication and time; more concretely, compared to a synchronous start in a
synchronous model of a non-self-stabilizing protocol, we achieve a constant-factor increase in the
time and communicated bits to complete an instance, plus an additive communication overhead
of O(n log n) broadcasted bits per time unit and node. The latter can be further reduced, at an
additive increase in time complexity.
1 Introduction
Consensus is a fundamental fault-tolerance primitive in distributed systems, which has been in-
troduced several decades ago [15]. Given a system of n nodes, some of which may be faulty and
disobey the protocol in an arbitrary fashion, the problem can be concisely stated as follows. Each
node v is given some input i(v) from some set of possible inputs I. A consensus protocol resilient
to f faults must—under the constraint that at most f nodes are faulty—satisfy that
Termination: every correct node eventually terminates and outputs a value o(v) ∈ I;
Agreement: o(v) = o(w) for correct nodes v, w (we thus may talk of the output of the protocol);
Validity: if i(v) = i(w) for all correct v, w, this is also the output value.
The main optimization criteria are the resilience f ([15]), the running time, i.e., the time until all
nodes terminate ([12]), and the number of messages and bits sent by correct nodes ([8]).
A Motivating Example
Two major international banks, A and B, are long-standing rivals. The evil CEO of bank B hires
a professional infiltration specialist and hacker to cause maximal damage to bank A. She offers her
services to bank A to inspect the robustness of their systems. Having full access, she learns that
bank A has been very thorough: All data is replicated at multiple locations, and any changes are
done using a state-of-the-art consensus algorithm; if a customer or employee commits any value, it
is encrypted and sent to the different locations via secure channels, where it serves as input for the
consensus routine.
Consequently, she looks for a way to bring the system down. The consensus algorithm is
Byzantine fault-tolerant, i.e., resilient to arbitrary behavior of a minority of the data centers.
However, she knows that such algorithms are costly in terms of computation and communication.
Closer examination reveals that the bank solved this by restricting the frequency at which consensus
is run and using a synchronous protocol. Every second, an instance of the algorithm is started that
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commits the batch of recent changes. Due to these choices, the infrastructure is capable of dealing
with an influx of operations well beyond the peak loads.
Nonetheless, the spy now knows how to break the system. She takes control of the external
sources the data centers obtain their timing information from—which are outside bank A’s control—
and feeds conflicting time values to the different data centers. For most operations, the result is
denial of service, but in some instances the lack of synchrony leads to inconsistent commits. Despite
bank A’s excellent IT security, the damage is dramatic.
An Alternative Approach
Could bank A have averted its fate? Clearly, relying on a trusted external time reference is chancy.
On the other hand, dropping timing conditions entirely would necessitate to use asynchronous
consensus protocols, which offer substantially worse trade-offs between efficiency and reliability.
A third option is to make use of a time reference under control of the bank. However, to avoid
introducing a new point of vulnerability to the system, it needs to be replicated as well. An obvious
choice here is to equip each node of the system (a.k.a. data center) with its own clock.
There are two possibilities for leveraging such hardware clocks: (i) using local timing conditions
at each node in a consensus algorithm, or (ii) running a clock synchronization algorithm to compute
synchronized logical clocks and executing synchronous algorithms driven by these clocks.
Regarding (ii), repetitive consensus (or other, tailored solutions, e.g., [18]) can be used to
maintain a common clock despite faults. However, how can initial synchronization be established,
without relying on some external means? Moreover, if a node rejoins the network (after mainte-
nance or a transient fault), or the system is to recover from a partition, is this possible without
external intervention? The notion of self-stabilization [5] covers all these scenarios: a self-stabilizing
algorithm must eventually establish a valid state, no matter the initial state it is started from.
Byzantine self-stabilizing clock synchronization algorithms [6, 9, 13] provide solutions for (ii).
There is a close relation to consensus in general and (i) in particular. To the best of our knowledge,
all known algorithms for (ii) employ techniques commonly found in consensus algorithms, and most
of them make explicit use of consensus protocols as subroutines.
With respect to (i), the question arises on how to decide on when to run consensus. Without any
agreement on a global time among the nodes, some other global reference needs to be established
in order to jointly start an instance of the consensus protocol at all nodes. While a broadcast of a
single node could establish such a reference, this is problematic if the respective node is corrupted.
Even if we add redundancy by allowing for multiple nodes initiating instances, a mechanism is
required to prevent that corrupt nodes overwhelm the system with too many instances or initialize
runs inconsistently.
In particular the latter issue is not be taken lightly, as it entails to establish agreement among
the nodes on whether consensus is to be run or not! Considering that the vast majority of the
literature on consensus assumes that all nodes in unison start executing an algorithm at a specific
time1 we consider it both surprising and alarming that this issue is not addressed by existing work.
Further Related Work
The issues that surface when running consensus in practice have been studied extensively. Re-
searchers distinguished between “Atomic Broadcast” that may be repeatedly executed and “Con-
1Observe that even asynchronous models assume that all nodes fully participate at the invoked consensus once
they “wake-up”. This can be logically mapped to all nodes participating unconditionally from time 0 on, much like
the unison start of the synchronous algorithms.
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sensus” ([17]) that was considered as a “single shot”. Running a synchronous protocol in a semi-
synchronous environment was studied comprehensively [1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 16, 14]. Lower bounds, upper
bounds and failure models were presented, and complexity measures were analyzed. But all previ-
ous work explicitly or implicitly assumes that when consensus is invoked, every node has an input
and executes the protocol to reach the target value that is determined by the set of inputs. Solv-
ing the question we consider using previous work translates to continuously running consensus on
whether to run consensus or not. Thus, such an approach enables the faulty nodes to cause the
correct nodes to get involved in an unbounded number of invocations.
Contribution
In this work, we provide a generic solution to (i), where the hardware clock Hv of node v may run
at rates that vary arbitrarily within [1, ϑ] and message delays may vary arbitrarily within (0, d).
Theorem 1.1. Suppose P is a synchronous consensus protocol that tolerates f < n/3 faults, runs
for R ∈ polylog(n) rounds, and guarantees that no correct node sends more than B bits. Then for
each T ≥ 2ϑ2d, there are a value S ∈ O(R+ T ) and an algorithm with the following properties.
• Each correct node v can initiate an instance of P at any time t ≥ S, provided that it has not
done so at any time t′ < t for which Hv(t)−Hv(t′) ≤ T .
• For any instance that terminates at a time larger than S, it holds that nodes determine their
inputs according to their local view of the system during some interval [t1, t1 + O(1)], and
terminate during some interval [t2, t2 +O(1)], where t2 ∈ t1 + Θ(R).
• If a correct node initiates an instance at time t ≥ S, then t1 = t.
• Each instance for which t2 ≥ S satisfies termination, agreement, and validity.
• Each correct node sends at most O(n2 log n+ nBR/T ) amortized bits per time unit.
• The above guarantees hold in the presence of f faulty nodes and for arbitrary initial states.
This statement can be extended to randomized algorithms that satisfy agreement and validity
with high probability,2 and accepting that inputs are determined within a time window of size O(T )
enables to decrease the amortized bit complexity per node to O((n2 log n+nBR)/T ) (see Section 7).
We remark that our results bear the promise of improved solutions to (ii).
2 Model and Problem
For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that there is a global reference time. Whenever we talk
of a time, it will refer to this reference time from R+0 , which is unknown to the nodes.
Distributed System
We model the distributed system as a finite set of n nodes V = {1, . . . , n} that communicate via
message passing. Each such message is subject to a delay from the range (0, d), where d ∈ O(1).
Every node can directly communicate to every other node. The sender of a message can be identified
by the receiver. Up to f < n/3 nodes are Byzantine faulty, i.e., exhibit arbitrary behavior. We
denote the set of correct nodes (i.e., those that are not faulty) by G. Initially, correct nodes’ states
are arbitrary, and the communication network may deliver arbitrary messages prior to time d.
Each node v ∈ V is equipped with a hardware clock Hv : R+0 → R+0 . (We will show in Section 5
that bounded and discrete clocks are sufficient, but use the unbounded and continuous abstraction
2I.e., probability at least 1− 1/nc, where c is an arbitrary constant that is chosen upfront.
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throughout our proofs.) Clock rates are within [1, ϑ] (with respect to the reference time), where
ϑ − 1 is the (maximal) clock drift. For any times t < t′ and correct node v ∈ G, it holds that
t′ − t ≤ Hv(t′) − Hv(t) ≤ ϑ(t′ − t). Since hardware clocks are not synchronized, nodes typically
use them to approximately measure timespans by timeouts. A timeout can be either expired or not
expired. When node v resets a timeout of duration T ∈ R+ at time t, it is not expired during [t, t′),
where t′ is the unique time satisfying that Hv(t′) − Hv(t) = T . The timeout expires when it has
not been reset within the last T local time (i.e., the last T units of time according to Hv).
Algorithms and Executions. Executions are event-based. An event can be a node’s hardware
clock reaching a certain value, a timeout expiring, or the reception of a message. Upon an event at
time t, a node may read its hardware clock Hv(t), perform local computations, store values, send
messages, and reset timeouts. For simplicity, all these operations require 0 time and we assume
that no two events happen at the same time.
Problem Formulation
We will solve a slightly weaker problem than stated in the abstract, from which the claimed results
readily follow. We are given a deterministic, synchronous, binary R-round consensus protocol P
resilient to f < n/3 faults. The goal of the initiation problem is to enable correct nodes to initiate
independent executions of instances of P. More precisely:
1. Each instance carries a label (v,Hv) ∈ V × R+0 .
2. If node v ∈ G decides to initiate an instance, this instance has label (v,Hv(t)).
3. For each instance, each node w ∈ G decides whether it participates in the instance at some
time tw. If it does, we assume that it has access to some appropriate input iw(v,Hv, tw) ∈
{0, 1} (which it may or may not use as the input for this instance), and we require that it
eventually terminates the instance and outputs some value ow(v,Hv) ∈ {0, 1}.
4. If v ∈ G initializes instance (v,Hv(t)) at time t, each w ∈ G decides to participate, tw ∈
t+ Θ(d), and it will terminate this instance at some time from t+ Θ(R).
5. If w,w′ ∈ G participate in instance (v,Hv), then ow(v,Hv) = ow′(v,Hv).
6. If all nodes in G participate in an instance and use the same input b, they all output b.
7. If ow(v,Hv) 6= 0 for some w ∈ G, then all nodes in G participate in this instance, terminate
within a time window [t−, t+] of constant size, and some u ∈ G satisfies that iu(v,Hv, tu) =
ow(v,Hv) for some tu ∈ t+ −Θ(R).
Compared to “classic” consensus, property 4 corresponds to termination, property 5 to agreement,
and property 6 to validity. Note that validity is replaced by a safety property in case not all correct
nodes participate: property 7 states that non-zero output is feasible only if no correct node is left
out. Finally, property 8 makes sure that all nodes participate in case a non-faulty node initializes
an instance, therefore ensuring validity for such instances.
Put simply, these rules ensure that each instance (v,Hv(t)) initiated by a correct node behaves
like a “classic” consensus instance with inputs iw(v,Hv(t), tw), where tw ≈ t, which terminates
within Θ(R) time, and roughly simultaneously at all correct nodes. If a faulty node initializes an
instance, the timing conditions are guaranteed only if some non-faulty node outputs a non-zero
value; in this case we are also ensured that there has been some corresponding input Θ(R) time in
the past, i.e., the computed output is valid.
Assuming that the “fallback” output 0 never causes any damage, this is certainly acceptable. In
particular, we can use the initiation problem to agree on whether an instance of an arbitrary (possi-
bly non-binary) consensus protocol should be jointly started by all correct nodes upon terminating
the instance, at roughly the same time. Setting the inputs iv ≡ 1 (in the initiation problem) will
then ensure that the result is a solution to the task stated in the abstract and the introduction.
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3 Algorithm
In this section, we present a simplified version of our algorithm; in particular, it is not self-stabilizing
and has unbounded communication complexity. We will address these issues in Section 5.
Our algorithm consists of three main components beside the employed consensus protocol P.
The first provides each node with an estimate of each other node’s clock, with certain consistency
guarantees that apply also to clocks of faulty nodes. The second uses this shared timing informa-
tion to enforce clean initialization of consensus instances within a small window of time. Finally,
the third component provides a wrapper for the consensus protocol that simulates synchronous
execution. Before presenting the protocol, however, we need to introduce an additional property
the employed consensus protocol P must satisfy.
Silent Consensus
We call a consensus protocol silent, if in any execution in which all correct nodes have input 0,
correct nodes send no messages and output 0. Observe that even if not all correct nodes participate,
a silent protocol will end up running correctly and output 0 at all participating nodes if no correct
node has non-zero input. We show that any consensus protocol can be transformed into a silent
one.
Lemma 3.1. Any synchronous consensus protocol P in which nodes sent at most B bits can be
transformed into a silent synchronous binary consensus protocol Ps with the same properties except
that it runs for two more rounds, during which each node may perform up to 2 1-bit broadcasts.
Proof. The new protocol can be seen as a “wrapper” protocol that manipulates the inputs and then
each node may or may not participate in an instance of the original protocol. The output of the
original protocol, P, will be taken into account only by correct nodes that participate throughout
the protocol, as specified below. In the first round of the new protocol, Ps, each participating node
broadcasts its input if it is not 0 and otherwise sends nothing. If a node receives fewer than n− f
times the value 1, it sets its input to 0. In the second round, the same pattern is applied.
Subsequently, P is executed by all nodes that received at least f + 1 messages in the first
round (where any missing messages from nodes that do not participate are set to an arbitrary valid
message by the receiver). If in the execution of P a node would have to send more bits than it
would have according to the known bound B, it (locally) aborts the execution of P. Likewise, if
the running time bound of P would be violated, it aborts as well. Finally, a node outputs 0 in
the new protocol if it did not participate in the execution of P, aborted it, or received f or less
messages in the second round, and it outputs the result according to the run of P otherwise.
We first show that the new protocol, Ps, is a consensus protocol with the same resilience as
P and the claimed bounds on communication complexity and running time. We distinguish two
cases. First, suppose that all correct nodes participate in the execution of P at the beginning of
the third round. As all nodes participate, the bounds on resilience, communication complexity, and
running time that apply to P hold in this execution, and no node will quit executing the protocol
before termination. To establish agreement and validity, again we distinguish two cases. If all
nodes output the outcome of the execution of P, these properties follow right away since P satisfies
them; here we use that although the initial two rounds might affect the inputs of nodes, a node will
change its input to 0 only if there is at least one correct node with input 0. On the other hand,
if some node outputs 0 because it received f or less messages in the second round of Ps, no node
received more than 2f < n − f messages in the second round. Consequently, all nodes executed
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Algorithm 1: Actions of node v ∈ V at time t that relate to maintaining clock estimates.
1 if Hv(t) mod 2ϑd = 0 then
2 for w ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {v} do
3 if Hv(t)−Rwv > (2ϑ2 + ϑ)d then
4 Mvww := ⊥
5 broadcast update(Mvv)
6 if received update(Mw11, . . . ,Mwnn) from node w at time t then
7 if Hv(t)−Rwv < d or Mwww −Mvww 6= 2ϑd then
8 Mvww := ⊥
9 else
10 Mvw := (Mw11, . . . ,Mwnn)
11 if |{u ∈ V | |Mvww −Mvuw| ≤ (2ϑ2 + 4ϑ)d}| < n− f then
12 Mvww := ⊥
13 if Mvww = ⊥ then
14 Rwv := ⊥
15 else
16 Rwv := Hv(t)
P with input 0 and computed output 0 by the agreement property of P, implying agreement and
validity of the new protocol.
The second case is that some correct node does not participate in the execution of P. Thus,
it received at most f messages in the first round of Ps, implying that no node received more than
2f < n − f messages in this round. Consequently, correct nodes set their input to 0 and will not
transmit in the second round. While some nodes may execute P, all correct nodes will output 0
no matter how P behaves. Since nodes abort the execution of P if the bounds on communication
or time complexity are about to be violated, the claimed bounds for the new protocol hold.
It remains to show that the new protocol is silent. Clearly, if all correct nodes have input 0,
they will not transmit in the first two rounds. In particular, they will not receive more than f
messages in the first round and not participate in the execution of P. Hence correct nodes do not
send messages at all, as claimed.
Distributing Clocks
The first step towards simulating round-based protocols is to establish a common timeline for each
individual node. This can be easily done by a broadcast, however, such a simple mechanism would
give the adversary too much opportunity to fool correct nodes. Therefore, we require nodes to
continuously broadcast their local clock values, and keep updating the other nodes on the values
they receive. By accepting values only if a sufficient majority of nodes supports them, we greatly
diminish the ability of faulty nodes to introduce inconsistencies. In addition, nodes check whether
clock updates occur at a proper frequency, as it is known that correct nodes send them regularly.
This approach is more robust than the timing tests used in [7] to eliminate untimely messages sent
by faulty nodes.
Nodes exchange their clock values at a regular frequency and relay to others the values they
have received. To this end, node v maintains memory entries Mvuw, w, u ∈ V , where Mvuw = H
is to be understood as “u told me that w claimed to have clock value H”. At any time t, node v
will either trust the clock value node w claims to have, i.e., its estimate of Hw(t) is Mvww(t), or it
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Algorithm 2: Actions of node v ∈ V at time t that relate to initiating consensus instances.
∆ is a sufficiently large constant that will be fixed later.
1 if v initiates consensus at time t then
2 broadcast init(Hv(t))
3 if received init(Hw) from w ∈ V at time t and |Hw −Mvww(t)| ≤ 3ϑd then
4 broadcast echo(w,Hw)
5 if received echo(w,Hw) from node u at time t and |Hw −Mvww(t)| ≤ ∆ then
6 store (u, echo(w,Hw))
7 if |{u ∈ V | (u, echo(w,Hw)) stored}| ≥ f + 1 and Ewv (Hw) is expired then
8 reset Ewv (Hw)
9 if Ewv (Hw) expires at time t then
10 if |{stored tuples (·, ·, echo(w,Hw))}| ≥ n− f then
11 participate in (w,Hw) with input iv(w,Hw, t)
12 else
13 participate in (w,Hw) with input 0
will not trust w. The latter we express concisely by Mvww(t) = ⊥, i.e., any comparison involving
Mvww(t) will fail. Note that if that happens at any time, it cannot be undone; since w proved to
be faulty and we are not concerned with self-stabilization here, v will just ignore w in the future.
For simplicity, we set Mvvv(t) := Hv(t) for all times t and, to avoid initialization issues, assume
that Mvuw(0) = Hw(0) for all u, v, w ∈ G.3 Finally, v stores its local time when it received a
clock update from w in the variable Rwv , in order to recognize w violating the timing constraints
on update messages. The actions v takes in order to maintain accurate estimates of other’s clocks
are given in Algorithm 1. The “broadcast” in the protocol means sending to all nodes.
Initiating Consensus
Algorithm 1 forces Byzantine nodes to announce consistent clock values to most of the correct
nodes or be revealed as faulty. In particular, it is not possible for a Byzantine node to convince
two correct nodes to accept significantly different estimates of its clock.
However, timestamps alone are insufficient to guarantee the consistency of every execution of
the consensus protocol. Even if correct nodes know that a node claiming to initiate consensus is
faulty, they might be forced to participate in the respective instance because unsuspecting nodes
require the assistance of all correct nodes to overcome f < n/3 faults. Ironically, it would require
to solve agreement in order for all correct nodes to either participate or not. This chicken-and-egg
problem can be avoided using a gradecast-like technique, cf. [11]. If at least n − f nodes send an
echo message (supposedly in response to an initiate message) in a timely fashion (corresponding
to confidence level 2 in gradecast), the initiating node might be correct. Hence the receiver w
participates in the respective instance, with input determined by iw. If between f +1 and n−f −1
echo messages are received (confidence level 1), the node participates (as there might be a correct
node that fully trusts in the instance), but defaults its input value to “0”. Finally, if f or less
echo messages are received (confidence level 0), it is for sure that no correct node participates with
non-zero input and it is safe to ignore the instance.
For every w ∈ V \ {v}, v has a timeout Ewv (H), H ∈ R+0 , of duration 2ϑd, which serves to
delay the start of an instance until all nodes had time to make their decision. Algorithm 2 gives
3Since the full algorithm is self-stabilizing, we do not need to worry about initialization in our simplified setting.
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Algorithm 3: Actions of v ∈ V at time t that relate to running instance (w,Hw) invoked at
time tv. C is a sufficiently large constant that will be fixed later.
1 if Hv(t) = Hv(tv) then
2 H
(1)
v := Hv(tv) + C
3 if received message (m, i) from u ∈ V \ {v} at time t and no tuple (u, ·, i) stored then
4 store (u,m, i)
5 if |{(u,m, i) | (u,m, i) stored}| ≥ n− f and H(i+1)v = ⊥ then
6 H
(i+1)
v := Hv(t) + 2ϑd
7 if |{(u,m, i) | (u,m, i) stored}| ≥ f + 1 and (H(i)v = ⊥ or H(i)v > Hv(t)) then
8 H
(i)
v := Hv(t)
9 if Hv(t) = H
(1)
v then
10 compute M
(1)
v based on input
11 if Hv(t) = H
(i+1)
v for i ≤ R− 1 then
12 compute M
(i+1)
v , where ∃ stored tuple (u,m, i) with m 6= ∅ ⇔ received m from u in
round i
13 if Hv(t) = H
(i)
v for i ≤ R then
14 for w ∈ V do
15 if ∃(m,w) ∈M (i)v then
16 send (m, i) to w
17 else
18 send (∅, i) to w
19 if Hv(t) = H
(R+1)
v then
20 compute output, where ∃ stored tuple (u,m,R) with m 6= ∅ ⇔ received m from u in
round R
the pseudocode of the subroutine. We will choose ∆ sufficiently large such that each correct node
waits for all correct nodes’ echoes before deciding which input to use.
Running Consensus
Denote by tv the time when v decides to participate in instance (w,Hw), and byM
(i)
v , i ∈ {1, . . . , R},
the messages it needs to send in round i of the protocol. Note that since Algorithm 2 also specifies
node v’s input, it can compute M
(1)
v (the messages to send in the first round of the simulated
consensus algorithm) by time H
(1)
v := Hv(tv) + C, where C is a suitable constant that will be
specified later. All messages of the instance are labelled by (w,Hw) in order to distinguish between
instances. For ease of notation, we omitted these labels in Algorithm 3.
Essentially, the algorithm runs the fault-tolerant synchronization algorithm from [18] to ensure
that the clock drift does not separate the nodes’ estimates of the progression of time during the
execution by too much. If a node can be sure that some correct node performed round i (because
it received f + 1 corresponding messages), it knows that it can safely do so himself. To progress
to the next round, nodes wait for n − f nodes. Of these n − 2f ≥ f + 1 must be correct and will
make sure that others catch up. A timeout of 2ϑd guarantees that this information spreads and all
messages of round i can be received before round i+ 1 actually starts. The “non-messages” ∅ are
explicitly sent to compensate for missing messages.
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Note that if not all correct nodes participate, the timing bounds stated above may become
violated. However, since the employed protocol is silent and we made sure that all inputs are 0
if not all correct nodes participate, interpreting missing messages as no message being received is
sufficient to ensure a consistent execution outputting 0 at all nodes in this case.
4 Analysis
Distributing Clocks
As mentioned earlier, we do not have to worry about correct initialization here, since the ultimate
goal is a self-stabilizing algorithm. To simplify the following analysis, we may thus assume that at
time 0 each node sends two consecutive (imagined) zero-delay update messages. This avoids issues
in the proof logic when referring to previous such messages.
First, we show that correct nodes maintain trusted and accurate clock estimates of each other.
Lemma 4.1. If v, w ∈ G, then at any time t it holds that Hw(t) ≥Mvww(t) ≥ Hw(t)− 3ϑd.
Proof. Node w sends a clock update at least every 2ϑ local time. Since messages are delayed by
at most d time units, the clock of w will proceed by at most ϑd until such a message is received.
Recall that we assume that Mvww(0) = Hw(0). Thus, it is sufficient to show that w never sets
Mvww := ⊥, implying that it always sets Mvww to a value from (Hw(t) − 3ϑd,Hw(t)] before
Mvww(t) = Hw(t)− 3ϑd becomes satisfied.
Assume for contradiction that t is the minimal time when some node v ∈ G sets Mvww := ⊥
for some node w ∈ G. The clock of v proceeds by at most (2ϑ+ 1)d between consecutive updates
from w. Together with the assumption that Rwv (0) = Hv(0), this shows v cannot execute Line 4 of
Algorithm 1 at time t. Similarly, since nodes send clock updates every 2ϑd local time (i.e., at most
2d real time apart) and messages are delayed by at most d, v cannot set Mvww := ⊥ according
to Line 7 of the algorithm at time t. This leaves Line 12 as remaining possibility. We claim that
|Mvww −Mvuw| ≤ Hw(t)−Hw(0) ≤ (2ϑ2 + 4ϑ)d for all u ∈ G. Given that |G| ≥ n− f , from this
claim we can conclude that v does not execute this line at time t either, resulting in a contradiction.
Consider the most recent update message (before time t) w received from a node u ∈ G. It has
been sent at a time tu ≥ t − 2ϑd + d, as otherwise the next update message would already have
arrived. Since t > tu is minimal, we have that Hu(tu) ≥ Muww(tu) ≥ Hu(tu) − 3ϑd. We conclude
that
|Mvww(t)−Mvwu(t)| ≤ |Hw(t)−Hw(tu)|+ |Hw(tu)−Muww(tu)| ≤ (2ϑ2 + 4ϑ)d,
as claimed. By the previous observations, this completes the proof.
The next lemma shows that the employed consistency checks force faulty nodes to present
reasonably similar clock estimates to different correct nodes.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that v, w ∈ G, u ∈ V , tw ≥ tv, and Mvuu(tv) 6= ⊥ 6= Mwuu(tw). Then it
holds that Mwuu(tw)−Mvuu(tv) ∈ [2(tw − tv)/(2ϑ+ 3)−O(d), 2ϑ(tw − tv) +O(d)].
Proof. Consider the most recent update messages v and w received until time tv, at times t
′
v, t
′
w ∈
(tv − (2ϑ + 1)d, tv]. Due to the prerequisites that Mvuu(tv) 6= ⊥ 6= Mwuu(tw), neither does v set
Mvuu := ⊥ at time t′v nor does w set Mwuu := ⊥ at time t′w. Hence,
∃Xv ⊆ V : |Xv| ≥ n− f ∧ ∀x ∈ Xv : |Mvuu(t′v)−Mvxu(t′v)| ≤ (2ϑ2 + 4ϑ)d,
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and there is a set Xw satisfying the same condition for w at time t
′
w. Clearly, |Xv ∩Xw| ≥ n−2f ≥
f + 1. Hence, there is a correct node g ∈ Xv ∩Xw ∩G.
Denote by tvr , t
w
r ∈ (tv − (2ϑ+ 1)d, tv] the receiving times of the latest update messages from g
that v and w received until time tv and by t
v
s , t
w
s ∈ (tv − (2ϑ + 1)d, tv], respectively, their sending
times. Note that there never is more than one update message from g in transit. Therefore,
either tvs = t
w
s or one of the messages received by v and w directly precedes the other one. Thus,
|Hg(tvs)−Hg(tvs)| ≤ 2ϑd. Within 2ϑd time, g receives at most d2ϑe update messages from u, each
of which must increases its estimate Mguu of u’s clock by exactly 2ϑd, as otherwise it would set
Mguu := ⊥. We conclude that |Mguu(tvs)−Mguu(tws )| ∈ O(d), yielding
|Mvuu(tvr)−Mwuu(twr )|
≤ |Mvuu(tvr)−Mvgu(tvr)|+ |Mguu(tvs)−Mguu(tws )|+ |Mwgu(tvr)−Mwuu(twr )| ∈ O(d).
It remains to bound the progress of the estimates Mvuu and Mwuu during [t
v
r , tv] and [t
w
r , tw],
respectively. Again, v must not set Mvuu := ⊥ during [tvr , tv] and w must not set Mwuu := ⊥ during
[twr , tw]. Due to the fact that v and w accept update messages without losing trust in u only if they
arrive at least d and at most (2ϑ2 + 3ϑ)d time apart, we can bound
2(tv − tvr)
2ϑ+ 3
− 2ϑd ≤Mvuu(tv)−Mvuu(tvr) ≤ 2ϑ(tv − tvr) + 2ϑd
and
2(tw − twr )
2ϑ+ 3
− 2ϑd ≤Mwuu(tw)−Mvuu(twr ) ≤ 2ϑ(tw − twr ) + 2ϑd
Putting all bounds together, we obtain
Mwuu(tw)−Mvuu(tv) = Mwuu(tw)−Mwuu(twr ) +Mwuu(twr )−Mvuu(tvr)− (Mvuu(tv)−Mvuu(tvr))
∈
[
2(tw − tv)
2ϑ+ 3
−O(d), 2ϑ(tw − tv) +O(d)
]
,
concluding the proof.
Initiating Consensus
Having set up the bounds on the differences of clock estimates among correct nodes, we can discuss
their mutual support in invoking consensus. First, we show that correct nodes can initiate instances
unimpaired by the consistency checks of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 4.3. If v ∈ G initiates a consensus instance at time t and ∆ ≥ 3ϑd, then each node w ∈ G
participates at some time tw ∈ [t+ 2d, t+O(d)] with input value iw(v,Hv(t), tw).
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, we have for all times t′ ∈ [t, t + 2d] and nodes w ∈ G that Hv(t) − 3ϑd ≤
Mwvv(t) ≤ Mwvv(tw) ≤ Hv(tw) ≤ Hv(t) + 2ϑd. Each node w ∈ G will receive the init(Hv(t))
message from v at some time t′ ∈ [t, t + d) and, as by the above bound the condition in Line 4 is
met, broadcast an echo(v,Hv(t)) message. These messages will be received at times t
′ ∈ [t, t+ 2d)
and, as the condition in Line 5 is met, be stored by nodes w ∈ G.
Since only faulty nodes may send an echo(v,Hv(t)) message earlier than time t and |G| ≥
n − f > f + 1, the condition for resetting Evw(Hv(t)) will be met at each w ∈ G at some time
during [t, t + 2d). Therefore, each such node participates in the instance (v,Hv(t)) at some time
tw ∈ [t + 2d, t + O(d)]. By this time, w will have received all echo(v,Hv(t)) messages from nodes
in G. Thus, the condition in Line 11 is met at time tw and it will use input fw(tw).
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The following statement summarizes how the guarantees of the clock estimates control faulty
nodes’ ability to feed inconsistent information to correct nodes by timing violations.
Corollary 4.4. If at times tv, tw ∈ R+0 nodes v, w ∈ G send echo(u,Hu), then |tv − tw| ∈ O(d).
Proof. By Line 4 of Algorithm 2, we have that |Mvuu(tv) −Mwuu(tw)| ≤ 6ϑd. By Lemma 4.2,
|Mvuu(tv)−Mwuu(tw)| ∈ Ω(|tv − tw|). Hence, |tv − tw| ∈ O(d).
This entails that correct nodes use non-zero input only when all correct nodes participate.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose that ∆ ∈ O(d) is sufficiently large. If for any u ∈ V , v ∈ G participates in
a consensus instance labeled (u,Hu) with an input value different from 0 at time tv, then each node
w ∈ G participates at some time tw ∈ [t−, t+], where t+ − t− ∈ O(d).
Proof. Since v participates in the instance with non-zero input, it stores at least n − f tuples
(x, echo(u,Hu)). At least n − 2f ≥ f + 1 of these correspond to echo(u,Hu) messages sent by
correct nodes. Since v participates at time tv, it received one of these messages at some time
tv−Θ(d). By Corollary 4.4, all such messages sent by correct nodes must have been sent (and thus
received) within an interval [tv − O(d), tv + O(d)]. We conclude that (i) no correct node will join
the instance earlier than time tv−O(d), (ii) all correct nodes will receive at least f + 1 echo(u,Hu)
messages from different sources by time tv +O(d), (iii) as ∆ is sufficiently large, at all correct nodes
the condition in Line 5 of Algorithm 2 will be met when receiving these messages, and therefore
(iv) all correct nodes join the instance by time tv +O(d).
Running Consensus
The silence property of the employed consensus protocol deals with all instances without a cor-
rect node with non-zero input. Lemma 4.5 shows that all correct nodes participate in any other
instance. Hence, we need to show that any instance in which all correct nodes participate success-
fully simulates a synchronous execution of the consensus protocol.
Lemma 4.6. Suppose that ∆, C ∈ O(d) are sufficiently large and that some node from G partic-
ipates in instance (v,Hv) at time t0 with input value different from 0. Then each node w ∈ G
computes an output for the instance (Line 20 of Algorithm 3) at some time tw ∈ [t−, t+], where
t+ − t− ∈ O(d) and t−, t+ ∈ t0 + Θ(R). These outputs are the result of some synchronous run of
Ps with the inputs the nodes computed when joining the instance.
Proof. We will denote for each node w ∈ G and each i ∈ {1, . . . , R + 1} by t(i)w the time satisfying
that Hw(t
(i)
w ) = H
(i)
w (t
(i)
w ); we will show by induction that these times exist and are unique. Define
t(i) := minw∈G{t(i)w }. The induction will also show that all nodes w ∈ G compute and send
their messages, as well as receive and store all messages from other nodes in G for rounds j < i,
i ∈ {2, . . . , R+1}, of the protocol (i.e., execute Lines 10 or 12 and 3 of Algorithm 3) at times smaller
than t(i). Note that these properties show that the progression of Algorithm 3 can be mapped to
a synchronous execution of Ps and the messages M (i)w can indeed be computed according to Ps.
Finally, the induction will show that t
(i)
w ∈ t0 + Θ(id) for all w ∈ G and i ∈ {2, . . . , R + 1}; the
stated time bounds on t− and t+ follow. As the messages M (1)w the nodes compute in Line 10 are
based on the inputs the node compute when joining the instance, completing the induction will
thus also complete the proof.
Before we perform the induction, let us make a few observations. The only way to manipulate
H
(i)
w 6= ⊥ at some time t is to set it to Hw(t), provided it was larger than that (Line 8). Thus, once
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defined, H
(i)
w (·) is non-increasing, and can never be set to a value smaller than Hw(t). In particular,
the times t
(i)
w are unique (if they exist). Furthermore, the conditions for computing and sending
messages are checked after this line, implying that the lines in which messages are computed and
sent are indeed performed at the unique time t
(i)
w . Therefore, each node u ∈ G sends (at most) one
message (·, i) to each node w ∈ G, which will be received and stored a time from (t(i)w , t(i)w + d),
assuming that the receiver already joined the instance. The latter can be seen as follows. We apply
Lemma 4.5 to see that each node w ∈ G participates in the instance at some time t(0)w ∈ t0 + Θ(d).
Thus, if C ∈ O(d) is sufficiently large, each node w ∈ G has joined the instance and computed
H
(1)
w = Hw(t
(0)
w ) + C before time t(1) (which exists because H
(1)
w has been set to some value).
We now perform the induction step from i ∈ {1, . . . , R} to i + 1. First, let us show that the
times t
(i+1)
w exist. Since each node G sends some message (m, i) to each other node in G at some
time from t0 + Θ(id), each node w ∈ G will execute Line 6 for i at some time t ∈ t0 + Θ(id), setting
H
(i+1)
w := Hw(t) + 2ϑd. We conclude that the times t
(i+1)
w exist. Clearly, no node in G can execute
Line 8 before time t(i+1), as until then no messages (·, i + 1) are sent by any nodes in G. Hence,
t
(i+1)
w ∈ t0 + Θ((i + 1)d) for all w ∈ G. Now suppose that ti+1 is minimal with the property that
some node w ∈ G executes Line 6, defining H(i+1)w . At this time, it stores n− f tuples (u,m, i) for
u ∈ V , at least n − 2f ≥ f + 1 of which satisfy that u ∈ G. For each such u ∈ G, it holds that
t
(i)
u < ti+1, implying that at each node in x ∈ G the first part of the condition for executing Line 8
for index i will be satisfied at some time smaller than ti+1 + d. Consequently, t
(i)
x < ti+1 + d, and
all messages from nodes in G corresponding to round i will be sent by time ti+1 + d and received
by time ti+1 + 2d ≤ t(i+1). By induction hypothesis, the same holds for all messages to and from
nodes in G for rounds j < i. Thus, all claimed properties are satisfied for step i + 1, completing
the induction and hence the proof.
We conclude that Algorithms 1–3 together solve the initialization problem.
Theorem 4.7. Each consensus instance (v,Hv) can be mapped to a synchronous execution of Ps.
If the instance has output o 6= 0, all nodes in G output o within O(d) time of each other. Moreover,
there is a node in w ∈ G satisfying that fw(t) = o for some time t ∈ tw − Θ(Rd), where tw is the
time when it outputs o. Finally, if v is correct and t0 is the time when it initialized the instance,
all nodes in w ∈ G compute their inputs as fw(tw) at some time tw ∈ t0 + Θ(d).
Proof. Assume first that no node in G participates in the instance with an input different from
0. Then no node in G will send a message (m, i) for any i with m 6= ∅ for this instance: Ps is
silent, and Algorithm 3 interprets any “missing” message as having received no message from the
respective node in Lines 12 and 20; in particular, all nodes in G will output 0.
Next, suppose that some correct node has input different from 0. In this case, the claimed
properties follow from Lemma 4.6 and the properties of Ps.
Finally, assume that v ∈ G and t0 is the time when v initializes the instance. Lemma 4.3
shows that each node w ∈ G participates in the instance at some time tw ∈ t0 + Θ(d) with input
fw(tw).
With the initialization problem being solved, it is straightforward to derive an algorithm that
enables consistent initialization of arbitrary consensus protocols.
Corollary 4.8. Given any R-round synchronous consensus algorithm P tolerating f < n/3 faults,
there is an algorithm with the following guarantees.
• Each (correct) node can initiate an instance of P at any time t.
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• For any instance (also those initiated by faulty nodes) it holds that nodes determine their
inputs according to their local view of the system during some interval [t1, t1 + O(1)], and
terminate during some interval [t2, t2 +O(1)], where t2 ∈ t1 + Θ(R).
• If a correct node initiates an instance at time t, then t1 = t.
• Each instance satisfies termination, agreement, and validity.
• The above guarantees hold in the presence of f faulty nodes.
Proof. We run algorithms Algorithms 1–3 in the background, with input functions always returning
1 and Ps (the derived silent protocol from Lemma 3.1) as the utilized silent consensus protocol.
Whenever a node wants to initiate an instance of P at a time t, it first initiates an instance of Ps
using our framework. When reaching the threshold of echo messages to participate in the instance
(at some time from (t, t+O(d))), correct nodes store the input they will use if this call leads to an
actual run of P, according to their current view of the system.
Provided that a correct node initiates an instance, by Theorem 4.7 all correct nodes will compute
output 1 for the associated instance of Ps (by validity). This is mapped to starting an associated run
of P with the inputs memorized earlier, where a copy of Algorithm 3 is used to run P. Note that,
since all correct nodes participate, Lemma 4.6 shows that we can map the execution of Algorithm 3
to a synchronous execution of P with the inputs determined upon initialization, where each correct
node terminates during an interval [t′, t′ +O(d)] for some t′ ∈ t+ Θ(R).
On the other hand, output 0 is mapped to taking no action at all. For instances of Ps that
output 1, Theorem 4.7 shows that all nodes terminate within O(d) time off each other. Previous
arguments also show that the inputs to the resulting run of P have been determined Θ(R) time
earlier, as desired. We conclude that all claimed properties are satisfied.
5 Self-Stabilization and Bounded Communication Complexity
In this section, we discuss how the previous results can be generalized to Theorem 1.1. We will
add self-stabilization first, then argue how to use discrete and bounded clocks, and finally control
the rate at which consensus instances can be initiated.
Self-Stabilization
Within d time, the links deliver all spurious messages from earlier times; afterwards, each message
received from a correct node will be sent in accordance with the protocol.
We take a look at the individual components of the algorithm. Algorithm 1 is not self-stabilizing,
because the loss of trust in a node cannot be reversed. This is straightforward to rectify, by nodes
starting to forward received claimed clock values if their senders are well-behaving for sufficient
time, and subsequently starting to trust a node again if receiving consistent reports on its clock
from n− f nodes for sufficiently long. This is detailed in Section 6, where we present Algorithm 4,
a self-stabilizing variant of Algorithm 1.
As Algorithm 4 will operate correctly after O(R) time, it is not hard to see how to make
Algorithm 2 self-stabilizing. We know that a “correct” execution for a given label will start with a
“clean slate” (i.e., no tuples stored at any correct node). All related messages sent and received by
correct nodes as well as possibly joining the instance are confined within a time window of length
τ ∈ O(d). Hence, we can add timeouts deleting stored tuples from memory ϑτ local time after
they have been written to memory, without disturbing the operation of the algorithm.4 By making
4Note that this can be done in a self-stabilizing way by memorizing the local times when they have been stored;
if such a time lies in the future or more than ϑτ time in the past (according to the current value of the hardware
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the time to regain trust in a (faulty) node’s clock (distributed by Algorithm 4) larger than ϑτ , we
can guarantee that memory will be wiped before the faulty node can “reuse” the same label at a
later time (by “setting its hardware clock back”). This modification ensures that Algorithm 2 will
stabilize within O(d) time once Algorithm 4 does.
Similar considerations apply to Algorithm 3. We know that a “correct” execution of the al-
gorithm progresses to the next simulated round of Ps within τ ∈ O(d) time (all correct nodes
participate) or correct nodes do not send any messages in the simulated execution of Ps and out-
put 0 (by silence). Adding a timeout of ϑτ (locally) terminating the instance with output 0 if
no progress is made thus guarantees termination within O(R) time. Naturally, this may entail
that correct nodes “leave” an instance prematurely, but this may happen if the instance was not
initialized correctly (i.e., nodes have lingering false memory entries from time 0) or the instance
is silent (i.e., there is no need to send messages and the output is 0 at all correct nodes) only.
Similar to Algorithm 2, this strategy guarantees that false memory entries can be safely wiped
within ϑτR rounds; increasing the timeout to regain trust in Algorithm 4 to ϑ2τR thus guarantees
that Algorithm 3 will stabilize within O(R) rounds once Algorithm 4 and 2 have, in the sense that
to its future outputs the arguments and bounds from Section 4 apply.
Finally, we note that when calling Algorithm 3 for protocol P in Corollary 4.8, always all nodes
participate. Hence, the same arguments apply and a total stabilization time of O(R) follows.
Discrete and Bounded Clocks
In practice, clocks are neither continuous nor unbounded; moreover, we need clock values to be
bounded and discrete to encode them using few bits. Discretizing clocks with a granularity of
Θ(d) will asymptotically have no effect on the bounds: We simply interpret the discrete clocks as
readings of continuous clocks with error O(d). It is not hard to see that this can be mapped to
a system with exact readings of continuous clocks and larger maximal delay d′ ∈ O(d), where all
events at node v happen at times when Hv(t) ∈ N.5
As shown in Corollary 6.2, choosing B ∈ Θ(R) in Algorithm 4 guarantees the following. For
each sufficiently large time t ≥ t0 ∈ Θ(R), all correct nodes from G trusting some node v ∈ V at
time t received clock values from v that increased at constant rate for Θ(R) time and differed at
most by O(d). From this it follows that using clocks modulo M ∈ Θ(R) is sufficient: Choosing
M sufficiently large, we can make sure that for any label (v,H), every Θ(R) time there will be a
period of at least ϑ2τR (τ as above) time during which all correct node reject initialization messages
labeled (v,H). This ensures that memory will be wiped before the next messages are accepted and
the previous arguments for self-stabilization apply.
Bounding the Communication Complexity
Using bounded and discrete clocks and assuming that R is polynomially bounded in n, each clock
estimate (and thus each label) can be encoded by O(log n) bits. Hence, each correct node will
broadcast O(n log n) bits in Θ(d) time when executing Algorithm 4, for a total of O(n2 log n) bits
per node and time unit.
However, so far each node may initiate an instance at any time, implying that faulty nodes could
initiate a large number of instances with the goal of overloading the communication network. Hence,
we require that correct nodes wait for at least T ≥ 2ϑd local time between initializing instances.
Under this constraint, it is feasible that correct nodes ignore any init message from v ∈ V that is
clock), the entries need to be deleted.
5This entails that timeouts are integer, which also clearly does not affect the asymptotic bounds.
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received less than T/ϑ − d local time after the most recent init message from v. As a result, no
node will broadcast more than O(n log n) bits within T time due to executing Algorithm 2.
Moreover, now there cannot be more than one instance per node v and T˜ = (T/ϑ− d)/ϑ time
such that some correct node participates with non-zero input due to messages sent at times greater
than 0 alone (i.e., not due to falsely memorized echo messages at time 0): this requires the reception
of n − 2f corresponding echo messages from correct nodes, which will not send echo messages for
another instance labeled (v, ·) for T/ϑ time. Such an instance runs for O(R) time. There are at
most |G| = n− f other instances with label (v, ·) a node may participate in within T˜ time (f + 1
received messages imply one was from a correct node), all of which terminate within 2 simulated
rounds with “empty” messages (∅, 1) or (∅, 2) only.
For any v ∈ V , this leads to the following crucial observations: (i) If a node memorizes that
it participates in more than k1 ∈ O(R/T˜ ) instances labeled (v, ·) which did not terminate by the
end of round 2 or sent other messages than (∅, 1) or (∅, 2), its memory content is inconsistent; (ii)
if a node memorizes that it participates in more than k2 ∈ O(n/T˜ ) instances (v, ·), its memory
content is inconsistent; (iii) as memorized echo messages and memory associated with an instance
of Algorithm 3 is cleared within O(R+ T ) time, (i) or (ii) may occur at times t ∈ O(R+ T ) only;
and (iv) if a node w ∈ G detects (i) or (ii) at time t and deletes at time t + d all memorized
echo messages, forces all timeouts E·v(·) into the expired state, and clears all memory entries
corresponding to Algorithm 3, (i) or (ii) cannot happen again at this node.
Hence, we add the rule that a node detecting (i) or (ii) stops sending any messages corresponding
to Algorithm 3 for ϑd local time and then clears memory according to observation (iv). By (iii),
this mechanism will stop interfering with stabilization after O(R+T ) time; afterwards, the previous
arguments apply. Furthermore, (i) and (ii) imply that a node never concurrently participates in
more than k1 instances for which it sends non-empty messages, and sends at most O(n2 log n) bits
(O(n) broadcasted round numbers and labels) in O(T˜ ) = O(T ) time due to other instances.
Hence, it remains to control the number of bits sent by the at most k1 remaining instances.
Recall that the messages sent by Algorithm 3 are of the form (m, i), where m is a message sent by
Ps and i is a round number. We know that in a correct simulated execution of such an instance,
the node sends up to B + O(rn log n) bits within rd time: B is the maximal number of bits sent
by a node in an execution P, the additional two initial round of Ps require nodes to broadcast
single-bit messages, and logR ∈ O(log n) broadcasted bits are required to encode round numbers
and labels. Therefore, a node can safely locally terminate any instance violating these bounds and
output, say, 0. Such a violation may only happen if the instance has not been properly initialized;
since any instance terminates within O(R) time and Algorithm 4 and subsequently Algorithm 2
will stabilize within O(R+ T ) time, we can conclude that, again, this mechanism will not interfere
with stabilization once O(R+ T ) time has passed.
In summary, we have shown the following.
• We can modify the algorithm from Corollary 4.8 such that it self-stabilizes in O(R) time.
• We can further modify it to operate with bounded and discrete hardware clocks.
• For T ≥ 2ϑd, additional modifications ensure that, for each correct node, the amortized
number of bits sent per time unit is O(n2 log n+k1nB) = O(n2 log n+nBR/T ); this increases
the stabilization time to O(R + T ) and entails that correct nodes wait at least T local time
between initializing instances.
The resulting statement is exactly Theorem 1.1.
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6 Self-Stabilizing Clock Distribution
Algorithm 4, the self-stabilizing variant of Algorithm 1, is essentially identical, except that the loss
of trust upon detecting an inconsistency is only temporary. To this end node v ∈ V maintains
timeouts Awv and B
w
v for each node w ∈ V , of durations 2ϑd and B, respectively. The clock
estimate v has of w then is Mvww(t) at times t when B
w
v is expired and ⊥ otherwise. Timeout
Awv is reset whenever w announces clock values to v that violate the timing constraints, i.e., an
update message is sent too soon or too late after the previous, or it does not have contain the
previous value increased by 2ϑd. Whenever Awv is not expired, v will report ⊥ as the “clock value”
it received from w to others, expressing that there has been an inconsistency; at other times, it
reports the most recent value received. If a node keeps sending values in accordance with the
timing constraints, eventually all correct nodes will be reporting these values (as their A-timeouts
expire). Subsequently the check in Line 17 will always be passed, which resets Bwv whenever there
is insufficient support from others for the clock value w claims to v. Eventually, Bwv will expire,
and w’s trust in v is restored.
Algorithm 4: Actions of node v ∈ V at time t that relate to maintaining self-stabilizing clock
estimates.
1 if Hv(t) mod 2ϑd = 0 then
2 for w ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {v} do
3 if Hv(t)−Rwv > (2ϑ2 + ϑ)d then
4 reset Awv and B
w
v
5 if Awv = 1 then
6 Mˆvww := Mvww
7 else
8 Mˆvww := ⊥
9 Mvv := (Mˆv11, . . . , Mˆvnn)
10 broadcast update(Mvv)
11 if received update(Mw11, . . . ,Mwnn) from node w at time t then
12 if Hv(t)−Rwv < d or Mwww −Mvww 6= 2ϑd then
13 reset Awv and B
w
v
14 Mvw := (Mw11, . . . ,Mwnn)
15 for x ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {v} do
16 if |{u ∈ V | |Mvxx −Mvux| ≤ (2ϑ2 + 4ϑ)d}| < n− f then
17 reset Bxv
18 Rwv := Hv(t)
Note that it is straightforward to adapt the algorithm to bounded clocks modulo some value
M  B. As we just argued why the algorithm stabilizes in the sense that correct nodes eventually
trust each other, the following analogon to Lemma 4.1 is immediate.
Corollary 6.1. Suppose that t0 ∈ O(d + B) is sufficiently large. If v, w ∈ G, then at any time
t ≥ t0 it holds that Hw(t) ≥Mvww(t) ≥ Hw(t)− 3ϑd.
Lemma 4.2 is translated in a similar fashion.
Corollary 6.2. Suppose that v, w ∈ G, u ∈ V , tv ≥ t0 for a sufficiently large t0 ∈ O(d), tw ∈
[tv, tv +B/ϑ− (2ϑ+1)d], Buv is expired at time tv, and Buw is expired at time tw. Then Mwuu(tw)−
Mvuu(tv) ∈ [2(tw − tv)/(2ϑ+ 3)−O(d), 2ϑ(tw − tv) +O(d)].
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Proof. The requirement that tv ≥ t0 ensures that all spurious messages in the communication
network at time 0 have been received and, afterwards, all correct nodes sent and received at least
two update messages from each other correct node.
Consider the most recent update messages v and w received until time tv, at times t
′
v, t
′
w ∈
(tv − (2ϑ + 1)d, tv]. Due to the prerequisites that Buv is expired at time tv and Buw is expired at
time tw, neither does v set Mvuu := ⊥ at time t′v nor does w set Mwuu := ⊥ at time t′w. Hence,
∃Xv ⊆ V : |Xv| ≥ n− f ∧ ∀x ∈ Xv : |Mvuu(t′v)−Mvxu(t′v)| ≤ (2ϑ2 + 4ϑ)d,
and there is a set Xw satisfying the same condition for w at time t
′
w. Clearly, |Xv ∩Xw| ≥ n−2f ≥
f + 1. Hence, there is a correct node g ∈ Xv ∩Xw ∩G.
From here we proceed analogously to the proof of Lemma 4.1, noting that Aug being of duration
2ϑd guarantees that |Mguu(tvs)−Mguu(tws )| ∈ O(d) for two consecutive update messages sent by g
at times tvs and t
w
s .
7 Further Results
One can reduce the bit complexity from Theorem 1.1 further by reducing the frequency at which
clock estimates are updated. The loss in accuracy however comes at the cost of increasing the time
interval during which input values are determined.
Corollary 7.1. Suppose P is a synchronous consensus protocol tolerating f < n/3 faults, runs
for R ∈ polylog(n) rounds, and guarantees that no correct node sends more than B bits. For each
T ≥ 2ϑd, there is a value S ∈ O(T +R) and an algorithm with the following properties.
• Each correct node v can initiate an instance of P at any time t ≥ S, provided that it has not
done so at any time t′ < t for which Hv(t)−Hv(t′) ≤ T .
• For any instance that terminates at a time larger than S, it holds that nodes determine their
inputs according to their local view of the system during some interval [t1, t1 + O(T )], and
terminate during some interval [t2, t2 +O(1)], where t2 ∈ t1 + Θ(T +R).
• If a correct node initiates an instance at time t ≥ S, then t1 = t.
• Each instance for which t2 ≥ S satisfies termination, agreement, and validity.
• Each correct node sends at most O((n2 log n+RBn)/T ) amortized bits per time unit.
• The above guarantees hold in the presence of f faulty nodes and for arbitrary initial states.
Proof. We apply our reasoning for d′ ∈ Θ(T ), except that Algorithm 3 still progresses at one
simulated round within Θ(d) time.6 In other words, nodes send clock updates every Θ(T ) time,
implying that the clock estimates are accurate up to Θ(T ), and instances of Algorithm 3 are joined
within a time window of Θ(T ) by correct nodes. Algorithm 3 thus terminates within O(C +R) =
O(T+R) rounds, so we can choose the timeouts for regaining trust in Algorithm 4 and the maximal
clock value in Θ(T +R) as well; this ensures that the stabilization time remains O(T +R).
With these modifications, we have a bit complexity of O(n2 log n) per node and T time for
Algorithms 1 and 2. The bound of O((n2 log n+Bn)/T ) amortized bits per node and time unit for
Algorithm 3 holds as before, resulting in a total of O((n2 log n + Bn)/T ) bits per node and time
unit for the compound algorithm.
Since our framework is deterministic, it can operate in any adversarial model. What is more, we
make use of the agreement and validity properties of P only in executions simulating a synchronous
execution of the protocol in which all nodes participate. This happens only polynomially often in n.
6Note that we have to set C ∈ Θ(d′) = Θ(T ), though.
17
Hence, we can also plug randomized consensus algorithms in our framework that satisfy agreement
and validity w.h.p. only. A randomized consensus protocol terminating within R rounds satisfies
the following properties.
Termination: Every correct node terminates within R rounds and outputs a value o(v) ∈ I.
Agreement: With high probability, o(v) = o(w) for correct nodes v, w.
Validity: If i(v) = i(w) for all correct v, w, with high probability this is also the output value.
Note that, typically, agreement and validity are required to hold deterministically, while termination
is only satisfied probabilistically. It is simple to translate such an algorithm in one that satisfies
the above criteria by forcing termination after R rounds, where R is sufficiently large to guarantee
termination w.h.p.7 For suitable randomized algorithms, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 7.2. Suppose P is a synchronous randomized consensus protocol tolerating f < n/3
faults that terminates in R ∈ polylog(n) rounds and guarantees that no correct node sends more
than B bits w.h.p. Then there is a value S ∈ O(R) and an algorithm with the following properties.
• Each correct node v can initiate an instance of P at any time t ≥ S, provided that it has not
done so at any time t′ < t for which Hv(t)−Hv(t′) ≤ R.
• For any instance that terminates at a time larger than S, it holds that nodes determine their
inputs according to their local view of the system during some interval [t1, t1 + O(R)], and
terminate during some interval [t2, t2 +O(1)], where t2 ∈ t1 + Θ(R).
• If a correct node initiates an instance at time t ≥ S, then t1 = t.
• Each instance for which t2 ≥ S satisfies agreement and validity w.h.p.8
• Each correct node sends at most O(n2 log n+Bn) bits within R time.
• The above guarantees hold in the presence of f faulty nodes and for arbitrary initial states.
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